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The limits to ‘spin-off’: UK defence R & D
and the development of gallium
arsenide technology
GRAHAM SPINARDI*
Abstract. UK defence R & D played a leading role in the development of gallium arsenide
and other III–V semiconductor materials. Often touted as the semiconductor of the future
because of its potential for high-speed computing, gallium arsenide had unique properties
compared to silicon that made it attractive for military applications. Some consumer
applications were also developed, and these eventually became signiﬁcant with its use in
mobile phone handsets in the mid-1990s. However, despite the apparent advantage of close
links to the defence establishments and early access to expertise in III–V technologies, UK
companies had limited success in these civil markets, preferring instead to focus on defence
procurement.
One of the most signiﬁcant industrial developments of the second half of the twentieth
century grew out of the development of semiconductors and their application in
electronic devices. After some initial use of germanium, this industry came to be
primarily based on silicon semiconductors, and it is well documented that the UK failed
to become a major player in this technology.1
The conventional historiography sees this development as partly due to the mid-1950s
decision by the UK defence research establishments to focus their electronics work and
sponsorship elsewhere, neglecting silicon in favour of III–V semiconductors, and
particularly gallium arsenide (GaAs). Whereas elemental semiconductor materials such
as silicon or germanium belong to group IV of the periodic table, gallium arsenide is one
of a number of compounds formed by combining elements from groups III and V of the
periodic table and hence known as III–V semiconductors.2
* Institute for the Study of Science, Technology and Innovation, University of Edinburgh, Old Surgeons’
Hall, High School Yards, Edinburgh, EH1 1LZ, Scotland. Email: g.spinardi@ed.ac.uk.
This research was supported by grants from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. I am very
grateful for helpful comments from Donald MacKenzie, Robin Williams and Paul Nightingale, and for the
advice of the referees and the editor.
1 Peter Robin Morris, ‘The growth and decline of the semiconductor industry within the UK 1950–1985’,
Open University PhD, December 1994; Anthony M. Golding, ‘The semiconductor business in Britain and the
United States: a case study in innovation, growth and the diffusion of technology’, University of Sussex DPhil
thesis, 1971.
2 For general information on gallium arsenide see G. Gibbons, ‘Gallium arsenide electronics’, Physics in
Technology (1987) 18, pp. 5–10, 16; and Marc H. Brodsky, ‘Progress in gallium arsenide semiconductors’,
Scientiﬁc American (February 1990), pp. 56–63.
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The useful properties of III–V materials fall into two main categories: opto-electronic
and high-frequency. The opto-electronic properties mean that some III–V materials can
be used to build devices that either absorb photons (thus enabling night vision, infrared
sensors or solar power cells) or produce photons (enabling lasers or light-emitting
diodes). The good high-frequency operation of some III–V materials provides
capabilities suitable for radar (microwave) and telecommunications (satellite television,
mobile telephones, wireless networks and GPS navigation units) and also offers the
potential for ‘chip’ speeds greater than those provided by silicon.3
The decision of the UK defence research establishments to focus on III–V materials
stemmed from their judgement that silicon technology was sufﬁciently mature to be left
to the market and they sought instead ‘to leapfrog silicon technology by research into
group III–V compounds’.4 The initial impetus seems to have stemmed from the view that
‘gallium arsenide was the logical successor to silicon as a base material for transistors
and diodes’.5 This meant that the ‘research output in silicon technology from the
Establishments was almost completely absent during the critical period of integrated
circuits development and manufacture’.6
Some historians have judged this development harshly because they see the neglect of
silicon as responsible (at least in part) for the decline of the UK electronics industry. The
focus on III–V materials was undesirable, they argue, because these materials had few
commercial uses. Thus Morris claimed in 1994,
Far from any commercial spin-off, the result of research activities within Government
establishments led (although no doubt unintentionally) to the restriction of commercial effort.
This was because the work was targeted speciﬁcally at specialised materials and devices with
little commercial application.7
However, around the time that Morris wrote this, GaAs was about to take off
commercially, thanks to its application in mobile phones. The initial hopes for GaAs as a
successor to silicon, offering beneﬁts such as faster chip speeds (and, for the military,
radiation hardness), had been frustrated by the practical difﬁculties and expense of
producing such chips. For many years it was possible to sum up the story of gallium
3 The Cray-3 supercomputer, delivered in 1993, is a rare example of the use of gallium arsenide to achieve
faster processor speeds. See Andrew Pollack, ‘A speedier chip ﬁnally gets a lift’, New York Times, 14 October
1987.
4 Morris, op. cit. (1), p. 313, see also p. 128. There was concern over the neglect of silicon in the late 1960s.
For example, CVD’s Solid State Physics Research Panel complained in 1966, ‘We believe that there remains an
imbalance in the programme in that the support for work on silicon is inadequate in relation to the support for
work on compound semiconductors. The panel are particularly concerned about the fact that the UK is still
behind the US in silicon technology. Of the several (familiar) reasons for this situation we would pick out our
failure to spend money on research into silicon technology right up to and including the production stage.’
‘Solid State Physics Research Panel, Chairman’s Report to CVD Research Advisory Board’, attached to CVD
Policy Committee, 1 July 1966. UK National Archives [hereafter NA] ADM 272/244.
5 Golding, op. cit. (1), p. 352.
6 Morris, op. cit. (1), p. 129. Concerns about the supply of semiconductors for UK weapons systems led the
Ministry of Defence to encourage the dominant US manufacturer, Texas Instruments, to set up a UK plant. See
Morris, op. cit. (1), p. 319.
7 Morris, op. cit. (1), pp. 138–139.
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arsenide with an aphorism: ‘Gallium arsenide is the technology of the future, always has
been, always will be’.8
Nevertheless, the unique properties of GaAs and other III–Vmaterials meant that they
had found some civil uses, ﬁrst in light-emitting diodes (LEDs) used in displays, then in
satellite television receivers and solid-state lasers for CD players, but it was development
of mobile phones that led to a huge upsurge in demand for GaAs chips. Although still
much smaller than that for silicon, there was no doubt by the mid-1990s that there was a
substantial commercial market for GaAs.9
Much of the pioneering work on gallium arsenide and other III–V materials was
carried out at, or supported by, UK defence research establishments. This meant that the
UK was at the forefront of III–V research, and UK industry was apparently well placed to
develop commercial spin-offs.10 One measure of success could be seen in the
achievement of four Queen’s Awards for Technological Achievement in this area: for
crystal growth technology in 1979, GaAs photocathodes in 1987, metal–organic
precursors for epitaxy in 1990, and high-precision epitaxial crystal growth for advanced
opto-electronic components.11 Consequently, there was ‘a hope at one time that III–Vs
would be a key technology for the UK to exploit as an aid to future competitiveness’.12
This paper describes some of the key developments in III–V technology (particularly
GaAs) that came out of UK defence research and development (R & D). These
developments fall into three (overlapping) categories: device production, semiconductor
material production and epitaxial growth techniques.13 After brieﬂy introducing the
background to the institutional arrangements for defence funding of UK electronics
development, this paper will describe in detail the emergence of III–V semiconductor
technology in the UK, drawing on interviews,14 documents made available by the
research establishments, material from the UK National Archives and accounts written
by some of the participants.15
8 Brodsky, op. cit. (2), p. 56.
9 Silicon still accounts for almost 99 per cent of the amount of semiconductor substrate produced (although
less by cost), with GaAs and sapphire being the largest of the remainder. See ‘Compound semiconductor
substrates 2010 market report’, 16 June 2010. Available at www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?
id=289781.
10 On spin-off see Graham Spinardi, ‘Civil spin-off from the defence research establishments’, in Robert
Bud and Philip Gummett (eds.), Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in the UK’s Defence Research
Laboratories, 1945–90, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1999, pp. 371–392.
11 ‘Queens Awards for Technological Achievement, 1979 to 1991’. Leaﬂet produced by Defence Research
Agency, Malvern, 1992.
12 Roy Szweda, ‘GaAs the force multiplier – a GaAs Manhattan Project for the UK?’, III–Vs Review
(February 1991) 4(1), p. 4.
13 For a reasonably readable account of how semiconductors work see John Orton, The Story of
Semiconductors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
14 With Roland Ware, formerly of Plessey and Metals Research/Cambridge Instruments, Caswell, MA, 18
June 1999; Fred Myers, Plessey/GEC Marconi Caswell, 15 April 1999; Roy Szweda, Plessey Caswell and then
editor of III–Vs Review, 27 January 1999; David Wight, SERL and then RSRE, 6 February 1991 and 9 March
1998; Don Hurle, RSRE, 25 October 1990; Ian Grant, Wafer Technology, 20 February, 1999.
15 Of those cited here, Morris worked at Mullard and Texas Instruments, Hilsum at SERL/RSRE and GEC,
Parkinson at RRE/RSRE and then at the MoD (Director General of Establishments), Waldock at SERL and
then Metals Research/Cambridge.
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The discussion will then address the issue of spin-off from defence R & D – an
issue that has typically been framed as dialectic of two extremes. On the one hand, some
have seen spin-off as a beneﬁt to the UK economy, albeit one that could have been better
exploited. On the other, the effect of military R & D on the UK innovation system, and
electronics in particular, is seen as a pervasive and fundamentally detrimental inﬂuence,
draining resources away from civil innovation and undermining UK competitiveness in
commercial manufacturing.16
Defence R & D and the UK electronics industry
Defence funding played a major part in the development of the UK electronics industry,
providing both a market for products and a major source of R & D funding. For many
years defence support for electronics R&Dwas provided through aMinistry of Defence
(MoD) organization known as CVD. Originally set up before the Second World War as
the Inter-Services Committee for the Coordination of Valve Developments, CVD sought
to rationalize the burgeoning number of specialist committees involved in the application
of valve technology to warfare.17
Over the years, CVD’s role grew from coordination to active sponsorship of industrial
electronics R & D geared towards military objectives. In keeping with the shifting
emphasis of technology away from valves and towards semiconductors, the acronym of
CVD was retained whilst the organization was formally renamed as the
Directorate –Components, Valves and Devices in 1972.18
CVD’s inﬂuence on UK electronics R & D was huge. During the 1950s and 1960s,
MoD funding of electronics R & D in the UK far exceeded any other external source,
and was often greater than the industry’s own R & D expenditure.19 Although CVD
support came to be matched by that of the Department of Trade and Industry (and its
predecessors), it remained a major source of R & D funding up until the demise of CVD
in 1992.
16 For a range of differing viewpoints encompassing these two extremes, see the debate in P.E. Trier, P.
Gummett, J. Richards and A. Wallard, ‘The effect of the defence sector on the UK electronics industry’, IEEE
Proceedings (July 1988) 135, Pt. A, No. 6, pp. 419–430; also J.F. Barnes and B.R. Holeman, ‘The transfer of
defence research on electronic materials to the civil ﬁeld’, in E. Mondros and A. Kelly (eds.), ‘Technology in
the 1990s: The promise of advanced materials’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London
(1987) 322, pp. 335–346; D.H. Parkinson, ‘Defence research and civil spin-off’, Physics in Technology
(1987) 18, pp. 244–249; M. Seagram, ‘Does relatively high defence spending necessarily degenerate an
economy?’, RUSI Journal (1986) 1, pp. 45–49.
17 See Keith Dickson, ‘The inﬂuence of Ministry of Defence funding on semiconductor research and
development in the United Kingdom’, Research Policy (1983) 12, pp. 113–120, 114; Stephen Robinson,
‘Government management of defence research since the Second World War’, in Bud and Gummett, op. cit.
(10), pp. 393–415, 411–413; Peter Robin Morris, ‘A review of UK government involvement in the ﬁeld of
semiconductor technology within the research establishments’, in Andrew Goldstein and William Aspray
(eds.), Facets: New Perspectivies on the History of Semiconductors, New Brunswick: IEEE Center for the
History of Electrical Engineering, 1997, pp. 270–273; Golding, op. cit. (1), pp. 344–350.
18 Dickson, op. cit. (17), p. 114.
19 Dickson, op. cit. (17), p. 114.
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Defence-related electronics R & D was carried out at, or in collaboration with,
the defence research establishments. The two main establishments involved were the
Royal Radar Establishment (RRE) at Malvern and the Services Electronics Research
Establishment (SERL) at Baldock, which were amalgamated to form the Royal Radar
and Signals Establishment (RSRE) in 1976.20
Although the explicit policies and organizational arrangements regarding civil spin-off
have varied over the years, the underlying attitudes of staff working on electronics
technology were always supportive of rapid civil uptake. This was especially the case at
the Radar Research Establishment at Malvern where research was more basic in
orientation, especially during and after the period when it was part of the Ministry of
Technology (MinTech) in the late 1960s. The Services Electronic Research Laboratory at
Baldock and Harlow, which remained outside MinTech, was more directly geared
towards the development of service equipment. Nevertheless, the general view at both
establishments was that early civil uptake of new electronics should be encouraged
because it was likely to result in the development of more cost-effective manufacturing
processes.21
Of course, both CVD and the research establishments were primarily motivated
by the interests of the armed services, and not explicitly by any broader effects on the
UK economy. However, there was recognition that a strong UK microelectronics
industry was important for UK defence requirements. For example, a joint meeting
of the MoD’s Weapons Development and Defence Research Committees on 25 May
1966 to consider the use of microelectronics in defence equipment ‘agreed in principle
that it was in the interest of Defence to assist in the urgent building up of the
British microelectronics industry.’22 The question of broader support for British
electronics did of course raise questions about who would pay for this. CVD discussion
of the matter concluded that ‘the CVD budget was approved fundamentally for
expenditure in the defence ﬁeld. CVD would, however, be perfectly willing to operate on
the behalf of the Ministry of Technology if further monies could be supplied for this
purpose’. Even then, of course, there was ‘also a problem with the deﬁnition of “what
was a UK ﬁrm”, and this remained something which the Ministry of Technology had to
deﬁne’.23
CVD contracts, possibly followed by defence procurement, provided one potential
channel for industrial exploitation. This was complemented by the work of the National
Research Development Corporation (NRDC) that had the formal responsibility for
20 This became part of the Defence Research Agency in 1991, renamed the Defence Evaluation and
Research Agency in 1995. In 2001, part of DERA was privatized to form Qinetiq, with part retained under
government control as the Defence Science and Technology Laboratories, with both organizations operating
side by side at sites such as Malvern. A detailed account of electronics work at the RRE up to 1965 can be
found in G.W.A. Dummer, ‘A history of microelectronics development at the Royal Radar Establishment’,
Microelectronics and Reliability (1965) 4, pp. 193–219.
21 Barnes and Holeman, op. cit. (16), pp. 335–346, 336.
22 CVD Policy Committee, Integrated Circuits, Note by the Chairman, 22 June 1966, NA ADM 272/244.
23 ‘Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Co-ordination of Valve Development Policy Committee to discuss
Microelectronics held on the afternoon of Wednesday the 13th July’ (1966), NA ADM 272/244.
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the exploitation of inventions stemming from UK public-sector R & D from 1950 to
1985.24
In practice this meant that NRDC would take on inventions stemming from the work
of the research establishments so long as they were not unsuitable for reasons of national
security, nor the result of collaboration in which the industrial contractor would
be assigned the intellectual property rights. The relationship between NRDC and the
research establishments peaked in the 1960s with the advent of the Ministry of
Technology.25 Both the Royal Radar Establishment at Malvern and NRDC came under
the jurisdiction of MinTech, which sought to increase civil exploitation of the defence
technology base.
Amongst the initiatives promoted by MinTech, the most directly concerned with
semiconductor materials was the setting up in 1967 of an Electronic Materials Unit
(EMU) within the Royal Radar Establishment. This was intended to supply newly
available semiconductor materials to be used by industry, universities or other
government research establishments, thus avoiding the necessity for each to produce
their own.26
The EMU at Malvern was, like MinTech, short-lived. A longer-lived embodiment
of the collaborative spirit underlying defence-funded semiconductor R & D was the
Gallium Arsenide Consortium.27 Set up in 1966 under the aegis of CVD, the consortium
brought together staff from RRE and SERL with the main CVD contractors – Plessey,
STL (Standard Telecommunications Laboratories), BDH (British Drug House)
Chemicals, Mullard, and GEC (General Electric Company) –who were active in
semiconductor materials work.28 Of these, Mullard, based at Mitcham, was owned by
the Dutch Phillips company, and STL, the R & D wing of STC (Standard Telephones
and Cables) was owned by the US ITT Corporation.
Because of its potential for radar use, the microwave capability of gallium arsenide
gave development of the material high priority at Malvern (although it would be many
decades before GaAs could compete with older technologies such travelling wave tubes,
24 For an account of the origins of the NRDC see S.T. Keith, ‘Inventions, patents and commercial
development from governmentally ﬁnanced research in Great Britain: the origins of the National Research
Development Corporation’,Minerva (1981) 19, pp. 92–122; and G.E. Haigh, A.W. Pearson, D.S. Watkins and
M. Gibbons, ‘NRDC and the environment for innovation’, Nature (20 August 1971) 232, pp. 527–531. A
popular account of NRDC’s work is Peter Fairley, Project X: The Exciting Story of British Invention, London:
Mayﬂower, 1970.
25 On MinTech see Richard Coopey, ‘Restructuring civil and military science and technology: the Ministry
of Technology in the 1960s’, in Richard Coopey, Graham Spinardi andMatthew Uttley (eds.),Defence Science
and Technology: Adjusting to Change, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Press, 1993, pp. 65–84; and David
Edgerton, ‘The “white heat” revisited: the British government and technology in the 1960s’, Twentieth Century
British History (1996) 7, pp. 53–82.
26 ‘Electronic materials’, NRDC Bulletin (April 1971) 37, p. 19. I am grateful to the British Technology
Group (as NRDC was renamed) for providing me access to its archive of the NRDC Bulletin at its London
headquarters.
27 This was replaced by the Gallium Arsenide Technology Consortium, a joint MoD–DTI body, in the mid-
1980s. See Barnes and Holeman, op. cit. (16), p. 342.
28 D.T.J. Hurle, ‘National collaborative research into gallium arsenide’, Electronic Engineering (June
1985), pp. 149–153.
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magnetrons and klystrons for radar applications that required high power outputs). The
other main attribute of III–V materials, their opto-electronic characteristics, was initially
investigated mainly at Baldock. The much-publicized advantage of gallium arsenide over
silicon – that its operation at higher frequencies meant it was faster – turned out not to
ﬁnd much practical application, although emphasis of this apparent advantage over
silicon may have been politically useful.29
Device development
The ﬁrst useful devices made from III–V materials were light-emitting diodes
(LEDs). These can be made by simply connecting leads to a suitable piece of
III–V material with the emission of visible radiation occurring when voltage is
applied across a p-n junction. A number of materials were found to work as LEDs,
including GaAs, gallium phosphide (GaP), gallium arsenide phosphide, and indium
phosphide.
SERL was particularly active in LED development and in 1963 claimed the world’s
ﬁrst practical application of GaP with an LED array developed to mark positional data
on the TSR2 aircraft’s reconnaissance ﬁlm.30 In 1964 Ferranti took over production of
the arrays from SERL.31 Other arrays were developed at SERL during 1964 for the
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment as part of accurate time-recording equipment
for nuclear testing and for the joint US/UK re-entry physics experiments using Black
Knight rockets.32
With the technology thus proven, SERL withdrew from LED development, noting,
‘Requirements for the present gallium phosphide lamps can now be adequately met by
industry and this part of the device programme is terminated.’33 CVD continued to
support LED development (both GaP and GaAs) during the rest of the 1960s with
requirements for military systems being met by UK industry.34 In particular, Plessey and
Ferranti began work on GaP ‘with a view to exploiting the use of semiconductor
lamps’.35
29 Szweda interview, op. cit. (14).
30 SERL Technical Report No. 59, May 1963, 1.2. I am grateful to the librarian at what was then
the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency establishment at Malvern for providing access to these reports.
See also ‘CVD ofﬁce report to policy committee, March 1964: Development and device technology
programme’, attached to ‘Co-ordination of Valve Development Policy Committee, Minutes of the
108th Meeting held on Wednesday, 4th March 1964’, NA ADM 272/244. This notes, ‘The pioneering
S.E.R.L. GaP ﬁlm marker, now being made at Ferranti under Ministry of Aviation contract, was well received
by R.A.E. for aircraft cameras.’
31 SERL Technical Report No. 60, February 1964, 1.3.
32 SERL Technical Report No. 61, May 1964, 1.2 and 1.3.
33 SERL Technical Report No. 64, November 1965, 1. SERL did revive its interest in 1967. See ‘Minutes of
the 8th Meeting of the CVD Special Devices Sub-Committee, 1st November 1967’, NA ADM 272/251.
34 See the various Minutes of the CVD Special Devices Sub-Committee between 1965 and 1970 in NA
ADM 272/251.
35 ‘Solid State Physics Research Panel, Chairman’s Report to CVD Research Advisory Board’, attached to
CVD Policy Committee, 1 July 1966, NA ADM 272/244.
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However, SERL’s work with Plessey and Ferranti to develop LEDs left little industrial
legacy ‘largely because neither company was interested in investing in it’.36 CVD’s
Technical Committee complained in 1974 that it ‘had funded GaP research at Ferranti
and the work had gone well but the ﬁrm was not willing at this time to undertake
production’.37 In 1975 CVD reported,
The UK situation on LEDs was grave now that Ferranti had pulled out of the business. This
highlighted the inability or unwillingness of UK ﬁrms to exploit new devices or technology and
is particularly sad in this case as the UK was the ﬁrst to make GaP lamps.38
The difﬁculty of establishing a viable indigenous LED manufacturing industry, despite
CVD’s support and the work of SERL, led to much soul-searching. CVD’s Display
Devices Research Panel, chaired by Cyril Hilsum, noted,
With the demise of the Ferranti research team we have lost our longest established source of
LEDs, and the position of the remaining British suppliers is not very healthy. In this ﬁeld we
made much of the early running and invested considerable intra-mural effort. It would be
worth us trying to establish where our policies went wrong.39
Thereafter, Plessey was the sole UK producer of LEDs, although Hilsum noted bitterly
that ‘to keep them in business, CVDmust subsidise them’.40 Plessey apparently remained
unconvinced that the commercial returns justiﬁed a large investment on their part:
Our long term hopes (for GaP devices) now rest exclusively with Plessey. They are experiencing
the sort of investment return problem familiar to many component suppliers at present,
particularly in the UK. The future is quite uncertain here. We must be vigilant that we do not
end up with a materials improvement programme with no UK outlet!41
In fact, Plessey did remain in LED manufacturing, but mainly supplying markets
such as defence and avionics because it was ‘not really in that large-volume, low-price
business’.42 Its LED business was taken over by a management buyout just prior to
Plessey’s takeover by GEC and Siemens in 1989, and has since operated successfully as
PRP Optoelectronics, albeit as a niche producer.43
LEDs were a simple application of the opto-electronic properties of III–V materials,
but the ability of these materials to absorb or emit photons also meant that they could be
used to build lasers and photocathodes for night vision. Work on these started in the
1960s, but it was developments in epitaxial growth techniques that really brought them
to maturity and so they are discussed below.
36 Ware interview, op. cit. (14).
37 ‘Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Components, Valves and Devices, The
Technical Committee’, Minutes of the 144th Meeting, 20 September 1974, NA ADM 272/263.
38 ‘Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Components, Valves and Devices, The CVD
Technical Committee’, Minutes of the 146th Meeting, 17 July 1975. NA ADM 272/263.
39 Cyril Hilsum, ‘Report of Display Devices Research Panel – July 1975’, 30 June 1975, NA ADM 272/263.
40 Cyril Hilsum, ‘Report of Display Devices Research Panel – July 1976’, RSRE, NA ADM 272/263.
41 ‘Chairman’s Report on Applied Physics Research Panel’, CVD, June 1975, P. J. Dean, RRE, Malvern,
NA ADM 272/263.
42 Ware interview, op. cit. (14).
43 See www.prpopto.com/about-us.html.
104 Graham Spinardi
However, although the opto-electronics properties were the ﬁrst to be exploited, ‘the
original choice of GaAs was for use as a transistor material, where the higher band gap
would allow higher temperature operation and the high mobility higher frequencies of
operation than obtainable with silicon’.44 These theoretical advantages proved hard to
realize, and when CVD’s Policy Committee’s Research Advisory Panel reviewed the
CVD Research Programme on 31 March 1965 it concluded ‘that, under normal
conditions, GaAs transistors had few advantages over other transistors, but that they
might be valuable under conditions of high operating temperature’.45
This pessimistic conclusion followed some frustrating work done by a SERL-led
consortium involving STC, Marconi Research, Plessey Caswell and RSRE ‘under the
iron-ﬁsted chairmanship of Cyril Hilsum’.46 With little progress to show, this was
terminated after two years at the end of 1964.47 After being told that the project was to
be terminated, the Caswell contingent, while driving home, ‘vowed to continue the
transistor work in GaAs in some form or other and even before the return journey was
complete it was agreed to propose to the MoD that work begin on a gallium arsenide
ﬁeld effect transistor’ (FET).48
Plessey had the advantage of good-quality in-house material. In the early 1960s
Plessey developed a process for producing gallium arsenide in which gallium and arsenic
trichloride vapours were combined to grow epitaxial layers on a substrate.49 This
was acknowledged by CVD’s Solid State Physics Research Panel, which reported that
‘a process has been developed [at Plessey] to make high purity GaAs of quality superior
to that made elsewhere in the world’.50 However, the ﬁrst device to make use of this
material was not a transistor, but a microwave-generating oscillator known as the Gunn
diode.51
Although named after J. B. Gunn, an English scientist who had moved to work at IBM
in the USA in 1959, the Gunn diode was based on an effect earlier predicted by work
at the Mullard Research Laboratories in Surrey and at SERL.52 The UK’s early emphasis
on III–V materials R & D meant that, uniquely in the history of semiconductor
developments to that date, the ﬁrst commercial production of Gunn diodes occurred
in the UK, not the USA. In 1965 Associated Semiconductors Manufacturers (ASM),
44 G.P. Wright, Services Electronics Research Laboratory, 1945–1976, London: HMSO, 1986, p. 10.
45 Report of Chairman of the CVD Research Advisory Panel to Policy Committee, June 1965, NA ADM
272/244.
46 James Turner, ‘History of the GaAs FET at Caswell (1964–1985)’, IEEE Colloquium on Modelling,
Design, and Applications of MMICs, London, 1994, 1/1–1/3, 1/1.
47 Turner, op. cit. (46), 1/1–1/3; and J.M. Herbert and B.L.H. Wilson, ‘Solid-state research at Caswell’,
Physics in Technology (1986) 17, 132–138, 136.
48 Turner, op. cit. (46), 1/1.
49 K.M. Baughan, ‘Microwave device development at Plessey’, Physics in Technology (November 1976) 7
(6), pp. 254–259, 254, has 1965; Herbert and Wilson, op. cit. (47), 136, have 1963.
50 ‘Solid State Physics Research Panel, Chairman’s Report to CVD Research Advisory Board’, attached to
CVD Policy Committee, 1 July 1966, NA ADM 272/244. See also Baughan, op. cit. (49), pp. 254–259.
51 J.B. Gunn, ‘Microwave oscillation of current in III–V semiconductors’, Solid State Communications
(1963) 1(4), pp. 88–91.
52 Orton, op. cit. (13), pp. 195–197.
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a subsidiary of Mullard, in conjunction with GEC, began production of gallium arsenide
Gunn diodes, and other UK manufacturers followed shortly thereafter.53
The Gunn effect meant that gallium arsenide could provide a cheap, compact,
low-power microwave source with potential use in radar and communications
technology. Applications based on gallium arsenide Gunn diodes were one of the widely
advertised examples of civil spin-off used to promote the work of the Industrial
Applications Unit at the RRE, Malvern.54 Civil applications in development included
burglar alarms and portable ‘speed guns’.
Such potential for civil exploitation of the UK’s gallium arsenide expertise was a
matter of interest to CVD in the mid-1960s:
What is needed is a readiness to back, on a sufﬁciently large scale, proposals which can be
considered likely to lead in the right direction. Signiﬁcant national economic beneﬁts could
arise from research directed towards the early development of all-solid-state communications
systems, and there is a likelihood of stimulating a much wider use of microwaves, e.g. in
miniature radars. Thus there is justiﬁcation for putting public money into research in this ﬁeld,
additional to the Defence requirements.55
In the meantime, Plessey’s work on GaAs FETs during the 1960s eventually paid off
with the announcement in February 1970 of the GAT 1, ‘the ﬁrst commercially available
GaAs FET.’56 Although this particular device ‘did not perform as predicted by the theory
available at the time’, the development of the FET offered the prospect of high-
frequency, low-noise ampliﬁcation.57 Caswell continued during the 1970s with work on
MESFETs (metal semiconductor ﬁeld effect transistors) and in July 1977 the chairman of
CVD’s Power Devices Research Committee noted that Plessey’s GaAs work ‘continues to
extend the performance of microwave FET ampliﬁers to higher frequencies, higher
power and low noise, and the team at Plessey receives world-wide recognition’.58 Of
particular signiﬁcance was the demonstration of the ﬁrst GaAs FET-based monolithic
microwave integrated circuit (MMIC) in 1976.59
This development of transistors operating at microwave frequencies (and thus usable
for ampliﬁcation in radar systems) really became a practical proposition when good-
quality semi-insulating GaAs substrate became available. Plessey’s epitaxial growth
53 Golding, op. cit. (1), p. 84.
54 Ron Pretty, ‘R & D pay-off at the RRE’, Electronics Weekly, 8 November 1967; ‘Diversiﬁcation in a
government laboratory’, Nature, 11 November 1967, 216; ‘Spin-off: to industry from Malvern’, Engineering,
10 November 1967.
55 ‘Requirements for future power device research: a report to CVD Policy Committee’, Services Electronics
Research Laboratory, Microwave Electronics Division, Harlow, Essex, June 1966, byM.O. Bryant, Chairman,
CVD Power Devices Research Panel, Attached to CVD Policy Committee, 18 November 1966, NA ADM 272/
244.
56 Turner, op. cit. (46), 1/1–1/2.
57 Turner, op. cit. (46), 1/2.
58 ‘Power Devices Research Committee –Chairman’s Report to CVD Technical Committee – July 1977’,
K.G. Hambleton, ASWE, Portsdown, Appendix 2 to ‘Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence, Directorate
of Components, Valves and Devices, 150th Meeting of The CVD Technical Committee’, 19 July 1977, NA
ADM 272/263.
59 R.S. Pengelly and J.A. Turner, ‘Monolithic Broadband GaAs FET Ampliﬁers’, Electronics Letters (13
May 1976) 12(10), pp. 251–252.
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process provided material for their research, but during the 1960s bulk GaAs substrate
was typically made by the Bridgman process in which a pressurized, horizontal crucible
of polycrystalline GaAs is heated from one end to the other. Seeded with a crystal, this
results in virtually all the crucible contents crystallizing so that impurities are in effect
moved through the crucible as it is heated so that the ﬁnal section of the crystal can be
discarded with the impurities.
However, the Bridgman process produced semi-conducting GaAs and its low
resistivity makes it unsuitable for high-frequency applications because low resistivity
GaAs is susceptible to interference within a ‘chip’. To make this material semi-insulating
requires the Bridgman-produced ingots to be doped heavily with chromium, and ‘radial
non-uniformity made this material less than satisfactory’.60 An important development
in materials production was thus the development of crystal ‘pullers’ (see next section)
that could produce good-quality undoped semi-insulating GaAs which then enabled the
production of integrated circuits (ICs) using ion implantation: ‘High performance FETs
fabricated using this technology were ﬁrst demonstrated in 1977.’61
With the development of the MMIC and with suitable bulk GaAs becoming available,
Caswell was now able to produce devices for military phased-array radars in which
each radar element comprises a single transmit/receive device. Other applications also
beckoned and during the 1980s Plessey ‘took management control of the facility at
Caswell’ and ‘set itself up . . . to have a commercial presence in gallium arsenide . . . not just
for in-house specials; it was going to be a commodity supplier’.62
However, the takeover of Caswell by GEC in 1989, and the establishment of
GEC-Marconi Materials Technology Ltd in 1991, saw investment in GaAs production
facilities, but also an orientation more towards defence-procurement markets.63
Although there was a signiﬁcant civil market for optical modulators for communications
systems, Caswell found itself in the familiar ‘dual-use’ conundrum of attempting to be
effective as both a defence-procurement supplier and a commercial operator.64 As noted
by one commentator, ‘the constant battle between internal defence needs and the
external commercial aims is a challenge that few defence operations have successfully
pulled off’.65 According to one SERL/RSRE scientist, GEC ‘maintained a capability to
make these devices in the UK, and they are very good, they are world competitive, but
they are not commercial’.66
60 Hurle, op. cit. (28), p. 149.
61 Hurle, op. cit. (28), p. 152.
62 Myers interview, op. cit. (14).
63 Myers interview, op. cit. (14); Helen Duncan, ‘Staff anger at Bookham GaAs line closure’, Microwave
Engineering, 27 May 2004; Jim Turner, ‘Europe’s premier foundry operation’, III–Vs Review (October 1991)
4(5), 58–60.
64 Courtaulds had similar problems with its carbon ﬁbre operations. See Graham Spinardi, ‘Industrial
exploitation of carbon ﬁbre in the UK, USA and Japan’, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management (2002)
14, 381–398.
65 Stephen Entwhistle, vice president of strategic technologies practice at Strategy Analytics, quoted in
Duncan, op. cit. (63).
66 Wight 1998 interview, op. cit. (14).
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When Marconi demergered, Caswell was taken over by the US-based
Bookham Technology in 2002, and in 2004 Caswell’s GaAs production line was closed
down. This ended over forty years of work on GaAs, said to be the longest continuous
such activity anywhere.67 This was not the end of GaAs device manufacturing in the UK,
however. In 1999, with the help of a £5 million UK government grant, Filtronic took
over Fujitsu’s silicon foundry at Newton Aycliffe in Country Durham and converted it to
GaAs production, particularly aimed at the growing market for mobile phone devices.
Filtronic’s foundry became the largest GaAs device producer in Europe. However, even
then Filtronic was not in the top ten GaAs device producers worldwide, a list dominated
by US companies.68 Moreover, the Newton Aycliffe plant returned to foreign ownership
in 2008 when Filtronic sold its compound semiconductor operations to the US RFMicro
Devices.69
Material production and crystal pullers
One of the biggest successes of UK defence-sponsored work was the development
of crystal growth systems that could be used to produce III–V materials such as
gallium arsenide, indium phosphide and gallium phosphide. From the mid-1950s
materials work at SERL was dominated by efforts to produce gallium arsenide of
sufﬁcient quality to investigate its properties. Initially, GaAs ingots were produced by
the ‘ﬂoating zone’ technique that involved solidiﬁcation of a horizontal bath of
molten GaAs. In 1960 the SERL Technical Journal noted that ‘the quality of the average
ingot is now better than that available elsewhere. There is still no other British
source of high-grade material, but several ﬁrms are beginning production on an
experimental scale’.70
This production method was possible with GaAs, but not with gallium phosphide
(GaP) and commercial exploitation of GaP LEDs was held back by the lack of an
efﬁcient production process. Instead, the less efﬁcient gallium arsenide phosphide
captured most of the initial market for LEDs.71 GaAsP could be built up on a GaAs
substrate by adding phosphorous to a GaAs vapour.
Both SERL and RRE had used Czochralski pullers to produce silicon and germanium
and they now applied the technique to GaP.72 The Czochralski technique was a proven
approach for growing semiconductor crystals by slowly pulling a crystal out of melted
liquid. However, gallium phosphide was particularly difﬁcult to grow because it
dissociates at its melting point, making the standard approach impractical. To overcome
this, RRE developed a modiﬁcation of the technique in which the surface of the
semiconductor melt is covered with a viscous liquid (boric oxide) to suppress loss of
67 Duncan, op. cit. (63).
68 See http://compoundsemi.com/documents/view/cldoc.php3?id=8724#top.
69 ‘Filtronic sale is new dawn for GaAs in Europe’, EE Times, 17March 2008, http://eetimes.eu/en/ﬁltronic-
sale-is-new-dawn-for-gaas-in-europe?cmp_id=7&news_id=206903961.
70 SERL Technical Journal (November 1960) 54, pp. 1–4.
71 G.R. Blackwell, ‘Green light for LEDs’, NRDC Bulletin (Autumn 1975) 43, p. 5.
72 See SERL Report (November 1960) 54, pp. 1–9; Parkinson, op. cit. (16), pp. 246–247.
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volatile components.73 Known as the liquid-encapsulation Czochralski (LEC) technique,
this approach was then adapted to high-pressure vessels and taken up by Metals
Research Ltd under licence from the National Research Development Corporation.74
NRDC contributed a joint share of development funds in return for a levy on sales.75
Metals Research’s ﬁrst puller sale was to Bell Labs in the US, with the second one going
to Plessey Caswell.76
Known as the ‘Malvern’, this crystal puller became the standard method for producing
GaP crystals, with the pullers themselves selling particularly well in Japan.77
Improvements in the Malvern meant that between 1969 and 1975 the size of crystal
that could be produced went from ﬁfty grams one kilogram.78 However, this was still
not enough to make GaP production competitive with that of GaAsP, and the Malvern
also suffered from difﬁculties with its lack of user-friendliness and unevenness of crystal
quality.
Metals Research therefore developed a new crystal puller, the Melbourn (named after
the village near Cambridge where Metals Research was based), which addressed these
problems. Larger than the Malvern, it was designed to produce high-quality crystals
weighing up to seven kilograms. Moreover, whereas the Malvern was adapted from
RRE’s laboratory design, the Melbourn was designed from scratch as a production
machine, with ease of operation a main concern. Another improvement stemmed from
work at RRE to develop automatic diameter control (ADC). One of the difﬁculties
involved in Czochralski growth is instability that tends to produce a crystal ingot of very
uneven diameter. RRE’s approach, now widely used in crystal growth of many
materials, maintains an even crystal diameter through temperature feedback based on
the rate of the increase in the crystal’s weight. Working together, RRE and Metals
Research produced a world-leading design: ‘The result of this pooling of the intellectual
resources, experience and expertise of both establishments was a workable system, and a
properly engineered version of this has now been incorporated into the new Melbourn
puller.’79
During the 1970s, Metals Research exported its pullers all over the world, with
particularly strong demand in the US and Japan. The pullers were sold on a ‘turn-key’
basis as a ‘technology package’ that included setting up the machine and doing enough
growth runs to provide guaranteed performance.80 As Roger Waldock of Metals
Research joked, this could take two weeks to do at Westinghouse in Pittsburgh in the
winter, but three months at Hughes in Malibu in the summer.81 This, of course, meant
that at the same time as it was being successful in selling the crystal pullers, Metals
73 Blackwell, op. cit. (71), p. 6.
74 ‘Electronic materials’, NRDC Bulletin (April 1971) 37, p. 20.
75 Blackwell, op. cit. (71), p. 6.
76 Ware interview, op. cit. (14).
77 Ware interview, op. cit. (14). See also ‘Rowland Ware on old and new perspectives in materials science’,
III–V Technology Review (1987) 3, p. 18.
78 Blackwell, op. cit. (71), pp. 5–6.
79 Blackwell, op. cit. (71), p. 8. See also Barnes and Holeman, op. cit. (16), p. 30.
80 ‘As Cambridge fares, so fares the industry’, III–V Technology Review (1987) 4, p. 44.
81 Interview with Roger Waldock, in ‘As Cambridge fares’, op. cit. (80), p. 45.
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Research was also exporting technology that would enable overseas ﬁrms to compete
strongly in crystal production.
In fact, Japan very quickly came to dominate the production of GaP, largely based on
the use of Metals Research machines:
We also sold a lot of those machines to Japan, and the Japanese sold their GaP for less than the
competition, and totally wiped out the U. S. commercial GaP market and, while they were at it,
the European market . . . When you look at it, most of the LEDs you see are primarily grown on
Japanese substrates, and probably better than 80% of that substrate material is grown using
Cambridge [Metals Research merged with Cambridge Instruments] pullers.82
Established as the way to make GaP crystals, Metal Research’s pullers then became of
interest for GaAs production. Although the LEC approach had been investigated for
GaAs production, it was thought unsuitable because of the interaction with the boric
oxide encapsulant. In any case, gallium arsenide did not need to be made by the LEC
technique because it could be made by the Bridgman process.
Bridgman remains a major source of GaAs crystals because it is cheaper than LEC and
generally produces a better crystal structure, which is important for opto-electronic
applications. However, the Bridgman process was not ideal for producing GaAs material
for microwave applications –Malvern’s main interest – because the crucibles are made of
silica and the subsequent contamination of the material with silicon complicates the
production of semi-insulating properties.83 With concerns over the supply of semi-
insulating GaAs, CVD’s Applied Physics Panel ‘invited Metals Research to submit a
proposal for pulled material’ in 1975.84
The next, very signiﬁcant, step stemmed from work (both in the US and at Metals
Research, which in 1975 took over, and adopted the name of, Cambridge Instruments)
that showed that LEC GaAs crystals could be grown with semi-insulating properties
without chromium doping if silica was not present.85 Initially, this meant using crucibles
made of pyrolytic boron nitride, but then Cambridge Instruments discovered that the
same effect could be achieved using silica crucibles so long as the moisture content of the
boric oxide encapsulating layer was carefully controlled.86
This LEC-pulled GaAs also had the added beneﬁt that the cylindrical ingots produced
could be cut into cylindrical wafers that ‘were highly desirable if the processing
technology established for silicon ICs was to be taken over and adapted to gallium
arsenide’. As a result the Cambridge ‘pullers quickly came to dominate the world market
for pressure pullers and the materials base for a gallium arsenide IC technology was
founded’.87
82 Interview with Roger Waldock, in ‘As Cambridge fares’, op. cit. (80), p. 44.
83 ‘Rowland Ware on old and new perspectives in materials science’, op. cit. (77), p. 21.
84 ‘Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Components, Valves and Devices, The CVD
Technical Committee’, Minutes of the 147th Meeting, 11 December 1975, NA ADM 272/263. See also Hurle,
op. cit. (28), p. 149.
85 Ware interview, op. cit. (14).
86 Hurle, op. cit. (28), pp. 149–153, 150.
87 Hurle, op. cit. (28), p. 150.
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Cambridge Instruments thus repeated the export success that it had ﬁrst had with its
GaP pullers. During the 1980s interest in semi-insulating gallium arsenide led to
worldwide sales for Cambridge Instruments pullers (in 1987 it was estimated that 80 per
cent of pullers installed for GaAs manufacture in the US had been built by Cambridge88).
However, by the end of the 1980s the market for pullers had tailed off. Not only had
most potential customers already acquired all the pullers they wanted, but limited
demand led others to stop gallium arsenide production, leading to the availability of
second-hand pullers. In some cases, the initial desire for a puller was to ensure an in-
house supply of material for R & D purposes (in, say, device development), a
requirement which became unnecessary once satisfactory material became reliably
available on the open market.89
As well as producing the pullers, Cambridge Instruments also produced and sold some
III–V materials, mainly for R & D purposes or for military applications. Ironically, the
large number of Metals Research/Cambridge pullers supplied to Japan made it hard to
compete. As one of the key ﬁgures in the development of pullers at Metals Research/
Cambridge noted, ‘The Japanese wiped us out as well as everyone else in the GaP
business, and we went into GaAs.’90 However, although Cambridge Instruments
dominated the world market for high-pressure pullers, they were not so successful in
producing the ﬁnal GaAs product themselves, and it was noted that whilst ‘the CI pulling
technology is in the van of world development, they have been overtaken by several
foreign suppliers in wafer ﬁnish’.91
In 1985, the materials production side of the business was sold to ICI Wafer
Technology, which set up a new factory at Milton Keynes for the production of gallium
arsenide and indium phosphide. Substantial investment by ICI led to improvements in
the quality of wafer ﬁnishing, but at the end of the 1980s ICI corporate policy was
reconsidered, and the move into semiconductors was reversed.
ICI was not the only company to have invested in gallium arsenide production, and
production capacity exceeded demand in the late 1980s, leading to several withdrawals
from the market. Mining Chemical Products (MCP), the other main UK producer of
GaAs and other III–V materials – using a Bridgman method –was also ﬁnding market
conditions difﬁcult. As a result, in 1990 MCP took over the ICI Milton Keynes plant
(and relocated there from its site at Woking) to form Wafer Technology. In 1994 MCP
then also decided to move out of electronic materials and a management buyout took
control of Wafer Technology (four managers took a majority holding of 80 per cent,
with MCP retaining the remaining 20 per cent).
Wafer Technology (now a subsidiary of Cardiff-based IQE plc) continues to make
materials using both LEC and vertical gradient freeze techniques. These include LEC-
produced indium phosphide, which has become increasingly used in ﬁbre-optic
telecommunications applications because it is particularly suitable for making devices
88 Interview with Roger Waldock, in ‘As Cambridge fares’, op. cit. (80), p. 46.
89 Grant interview, op. cit. (14) .
90 Interview with Roger Waldock in ‘As Cambridge fares’, op. cit. (80), p. 45.
91 ‘A UK strategy for GaAs’, edited by David Colliver and produced by the Royal Signals and Radar
Establishment in the mid-1980s (undated), 14. This was provided to me on a visit to RSRE in 1990.
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that emit or detect at frequencies (1.3 and 1.55 microns) which provide the best
transmission through ﬁbre optics.
Wafer Technology also continues to make LEC GaAs, but mainly for customers who
use it for research purposes. The main market for LEC GaAs now involves larger wafer
sizes for use in device production, but intense competition for these sizes led to prices
that Wafer Technology could not economically match. American investment in this area
was driven by the ‘Title III’ programme that was initiated in 1994 and provided US
government support to build up a national gallium arsenide capacity.92 According to US
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for International and Commercial Programs,
Prior to the Title III project, U.S. ﬁrms accounted for less than 25 percent of sales
worldwide and were discouraged from competing more vigorously by the relatively small
market for semi-insulating gallium arsenide wafers, and by the high capital cost to be
competitive in this market.
However, by 1998 the situation had changed so that ‘these companies dominate the
U.S. and world markets with nearly 60 percent of the market and world-class product
quality’.93 More recently, Japanese companies Sumitomo and Hitachi, alongside the
German Freiberger Compound Materials, have taken over as the leading producers.
Although Wafer Technology continues to ﬂy the ﬂag for the UK in production of III–V
materials, it is now a niche producer.
Epitaxial growth
Semiconductor wafers are the basic building blocks of electronics, but most devices also
make use of epitaxy, in which precise layers of semiconductor are laid down on the wafer
substrate. This is used to control the semiconductor properties and to develop devices.
Initially the most successful approach, liquid-phase epitaxy (LPE) was limited in its
potential for high performance because of lack of precise control over both the sharpness
of the transition between the epitaxial layers and the evenness of layers across the whole
wafer. Two other epitaxial techniques offered better performance: metal organic
chemical vapour deposition (MOCVD), also known as metal organic vapour phase
epitaxy (MOVPE); and molecular beam epitaxy (MBE).
UK work on MOCVD was pioneered at SERL under Sidney Bass.94 Named after
its inventor, the Bass reactor allowed thin layers of material to be built up on the
semiconductor wafer surface. In particular, the organic-based process (originally
conceived by Hal Manasevit in the US) allowed the deposition of materials that could
not be carried by the previous chlorine-based process because of their reactive nature.
This was crucial because it opened up the potential for mixing aluminium arsenide
92 Jo Ann McDonald, ‘DoD funds provide timely stimulus for US GaAs producers’, III–Vs Review
(February 1995) 8, pp. 26–28.
93 News Release, ‘Department of Defense Program Contributes to Turnaround in a Key Semiconductor
Materials Industry’, 17 April 1998, at www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=1650, accessed 5
August 2009.
94 Barnes and Holeman, op. cit. (16), p. 339.
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(which was too reactive for chlorine-based epitaxy) with gallium arsenide to ﬁne-tune
semiconductor properties.95
SERL’s work led to ‘the world’s ﬁrst volume production of metal organic gallium
arsenide’ in the manufacture of an image-intensifying photocathode for military use.96
This proved to be ‘an unexpectedly difﬁcult development’, with the work started at
SERL in the mid-1960s not coming to fruition until the 1980s.97 Initial development was
carried out in collaboration with Mullard at Mitcham and STC at Harlow. Progress at
Mullard was considered ‘disappointing’ by CVD.98 Moreover, SERL’s expertise was
considered to be ‘well ahead of that in Industry’ and by 1976 had ‘shown a deﬁnite single
route towards the manufacture of satisfactory GaAs photocathodes’, and so ‘the
extramural programme on alternative methods [was] discontinued’.99
The situation was reported to the CVD Technical Committee in June 1977: ‘Recent
success on GaAs photocathode devices at Baldock has led to a review of the likely
applications, and a decision will be taken in the near future on whether to proceed to
development and if so, on what format.’100 SERL (which in 1976 merged with RRE to
form RSRE) now had ‘a preferred manufacturing method using hetero-epitaxial layers of
GaAs and GaAlAs bonded in glass, which also gives the required high sensitivity’. This
was initially done using liquid phase growth, but work continued on ‘vapour phase
growth using metal alkyls which offer the possibility of better layers’.101
When the decision was made by the MoD to initiate photocathode production, an
industrial contractor was required, but neither Mullard nor STC was prepared to take
the step into commercial production.102 Instead, EEV (English Electric Valve) of
Chelmsford won the contract for photocathode production. EEV had experience in
producing image-intensifying equipment (they were RRE’s main industrial partner in the
development of infrared imaging pyroelectric technology103), but had no track record
in epitaxial growth techniques, which was the key to the photocathode. However,
the SERL/RSRE team was conﬁdent that it could transfer the technology into EEV in
order to meet the MoD’s procurement requirements. This led to the development of
night goggles that went into service in the mid-1980s and were used in the ﬁrst Gulf
95 Wight 1998 interview, op. cit. (14).
96 Wight 1998 interview, op. cit. (14).
97 Wright, op. cit. (44), p. 16.
98 ‘Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Components, Valves and Devices, the CVD
Technical Committee’, Minutes of the 148th Meeting, 15 July 1976, NA ADM 272/263.
99 ‘Optoelectronic Detector Research Panel –Chairman’s Report to CVD Technical Committee, June
1976’, NA ADM 272/263.
100 ‘Optoelectronics Detector Development Committee, Chairman’s Report to CVD Technical Committee,
June 1977’, Appendix 3 to ‘Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Components, Valves
and Devices, 150th Meeting of The CVD Technical Committee’, 19 July 1977, NA ADM 272/263.
101 ‘Electronics Research Council, Department of Industry, Optics and Infra-red Committee, Extracts from
Research Programmes of the Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence’, P. J. Holmes, 11 August 1976, NA
DEFE 35/5.
102 Wight 1998 interview, op. cit. (14).
103 The role of the UK defence establishments in the development of pyroelectric technology is described in
R. Watton, ‘Infrared television: thermal imaging with the pyroelectric vidicon’, Physics in Technology (1980)
11, pp. 62–66; E. Putley, ‘Infrared spin-off’, Physics in Technology (1986) 17, pp. 32–37.
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War.104 This work was carried out so successfully that RSRE and EEV were joint
recipients of a Queen’s Award in 1987, but this award proved a poor guide to longer-
term technological performance. According to one account, changes in EEV’s manage-
ment resulted in a requirement for technical managers to rotate jobs so as to broaden
their experience, with the consequence in practice that the speciﬁc skills and knowledge
base necessary for photocathode production were eroded.105 EEV (now E2V) continues
to be a major producer of image sensors for defence and other specialist applications, but
using silicon-based CCD (charge coupled devices) or CMOS (complementary metal
oxide semiconductor) technologies.106
As SERL gained conﬁdence in the MOCVD technique it also sought to apply it
to laser production, its other big opto-electronic application of III–Vs. Laser action
in GaAs had ﬁrst been demonstrated in the USA in 1962.107 CVD funding for research
on GaAs lasers was focused at STL where the development of ﬁbre optics for
telecommunications was pioneered in the 1960s. Amongst the contracts given to
ﬁrms and universities to work on this topic was one to develop high-power GaAs
lasers placed with STC/STL in 1966.108 The following year, the availability of
devices from STC led SERL to cease its in-house work on GaAs lasers, though
SERL continued to monitor and support extramural work at STL through CVD
contracts.109
A familiar complaint of CVD concerned the reluctance of STL (which was owned by
the US ITT corporation) to move into production, as the CVD Technical Committee
noted in December 1970:
The expertise was concentrated at STL where ITT internal politics were vitiating any attempt to
increase the production effort to cope with the work. CVD had pointed out to ITT that research
projects in a ﬁrm with no production outlet was not a viable proposition.110
However, the following July, CVD were informed that ‘STL were setting up a pilot
production facility as part of the development programme and this should satisfy
demands until it grew to a size that would tempt the ITT organisation to take it into one
104 Wight 1991 interview, op. cit. (14) .
105 Wight 1998 interview, op. cit. (14).
106 See, for example, P.R. Jordan, P. Pool and S.M. Tulloch, ‘The secrets of E2V technologies CCDs’, in
Paola Amico, James W. Beletic and Jenna E. Beletic (eds.), Scientiﬁc Detectors for Astronomy, Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, pp. 115–122.
107 ‘Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the CVD Panel on Laser Research’, 4 October 1966, ‘Appendix II,
Notes on Mr Gooch’s talk on injection lasers’, NA ADM 272/248.
108 SERL Technical Report (May 1966) 65, p. 1. Standard Telecommunications Laboratories was the
research arm of Standard Telephones and Cables. They had been in receipt of CVD funding to work on GaAs
lasers from at least 1963. See ‘Minutes of the 4th Meeting of the CVD Optical Maser Working Party held on
25th September, 1963’, NA ADM 272/248.
109 Richard Mills, ‘Laser research and development, 1960–80’, in Bud and Gummett, op. cit. (10), p. 283.
See also idem, ‘British defence expenditure and the growth of technology: a case study of laser technology
1960–1970’, University of Lancaster PhD, 1995. For the concentration of CVD on GaAs laser support see
‘Report to the CVD Technical Committee from the Chairman of the Laser Panel – 1974’, NA ADM 272/263.
110 See ‘Ministry of Defence, Department for Co-ordination of Valve Development, Technical Committee’,
Minutes of the 135th Meeting, 2 December 1970, NA ADM 272/263.
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of its production facilities’.111 Moreover, it was concluded that the ‘policy
of concentrating all the CVD funding on semiconductor lasers at STL appears to be
paying off with performance data somewhat better than those obtained in the USA’.112
By 1975, ‘STL had set up a unit at Paignton for the production of GaAs lasers and were
selling mostly in the export market’.113
RSRE’s success with MOCVD-produced photocathodes then led them to apply the
same approach to lasers in the late 1970s: ‘we said, well, we haven’t ﬁnished there, this is
a generic technology’.114 This required a more complex structure than that used in the
photocathode, with more junctions and much more precise control of layer thickness.
Once mastered, however, lasers produced by MOCVD offered better performance than
previously possible.
The new levels of efﬁciency achieved in these devices stemmed from the application
of ‘low-dimensional structures’ (LDS) physics.115 LDS takes advantage of the ability
to build up precisely (one atomic plain at a time) the epitaxial layers in a crystal
structure while mixing gallium arsenide and aluminium arsenide layers without
disrupting the structure (because they have the same lattice spacing). This means that
the semiconductor properties can be very precisely controlled, and in LDS this
manipulation extends to the use of crystal structures with wavelengths shorter than an
electron wavelength. This allows electronic activity to be restricted to two dimensions
within an epitaxial layer, providing even more precise control over semiconductor
properties.
RSRE’s collaboration with STC (at both Harlow and Paignton) on MOCVD
technology led to a Queen’s Award for Technology in 1991. Commercial exploitation
was aided by British Telecom support for STC research which led to worldwide
application of MOCVD in communications technology. STC Optical Devices at
Paignton was ﬁrst taken over by Nortel (with major job losses following), then by
Bookham Technology, which itself merged with Avanex to form Oclaro.116 Paignton
now operates as a research facility with MOCVD being used for laser manufacturing
being carried out at Caswell, also now owned by Oclaro.117
In addition to companies using the technology in device production, other UK
companies became suppliers of the production technology itself. MOCVD reactors
111 ‘Ministry of Defence, Department for Co-ordination of Valve Development, The Technical Committee’,
Minutes of the 137th Meeting, 13 July 1971, NA ADM 272/263.
112 ‘Report for CVD Technical Committee CVD Development Projects – lasers’, attached to ‘Procurement
Executive, Ministry of Defence, Department of Components, Valves and Devices, The Technical Committee’,
Minutes of the 140th Meeting, 22 November 1972, NA ADM 272/263.
113 ‘Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Components, Valves and Devices, The
CVD Technical Committee’, Minutes of the 146th Meeting, 17 July 1975, NA ADM 272/263.
114 Wight 1998 interview, op. cit. (14).
115 D.A. Anderson and C.R. Whitehouse, ‘Low dimensional structures’, in RSRE Research Review 1985,
London: HMSO, 1985, pp. 136–141.
116 ‘Global tech ﬁrm out of Nortel’s ashes’,Herald Express, 25 February 2010. See www.thisissouthdevon.
co.uk/news/Global-tech-ﬁrm-Nortel-s-ashes/article-1866351–detail/article.html.
117 Andy Carter, ‘Unlocking the value of fab ownership’, Compound Semiconductor (1 February 2010),
available at http://compoundsemiconductor.net/csc/features-details.php?id=19607287.
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based on Sidney Bass’s original design were produced and sold by EEV, Thomas
Swann and Cambridge Instruments (although the last of these preferred the term
metal organic vapour phase epitaxy or MOVPE).118 RSRE research also led to
the development of a reactor sold by EEV that was capable of growing narrow band-gap
II–VI materials such as cadmium mercury telluride, used in high-quality infrared vision
systems.119
A further spin-off from work at RSRE centred on the source materials used in the
MOCVD process, such as trimethyl gallium and trimethyl aluminium. Very high levels
of purity (better than one part per million) are required for these precursors if the
semiconductor properties are not to be degraded. Two early UK producers of such
materials, BDH Chemicals Ltd and Mining and Chemical Products Ltd, both licensed
technology via the NRDC.120 Other work resulting from collaboration between RSRE
and teams at Liverpool University and Queen Mary College in London was taken up
by a new company, EPICHEM, founded in 1983 with the help of the Merseyside
Development Corporation.121
The other area of epitaxial technology to which the UK defence establishments made
a signiﬁcant contribution was molecular beam epitaxy (MBE). MBE is carried out in a
very high vacuum, providing a very precise process for research purposes, although
initially the high expense and low throughput limited its suitability for mass pro-
duction.122 UK work on MBE was stimulated by the formation in 1983 of an MBE
Working Party within the Gallium Arsenide Consortium.123 This interest created a
market for MBE reactors which was met by VacuumGenerators Ltd (later VG Semicon),
which along with collaboration between the company and RSRE led to VG Semicon
becoming a major world supplier of MBE equipment.124
Discussion
Pioneering in its technical content, UK work on III–V technologies was heavily shaped
by its military context. As recalled by one of the key ﬁgures at Malvern, the work of the
defence research establishments and the support of CVD played a major part in
establishing ‘the technical and commercial materials base for a UK III–V industry, not
historically enjoyed by the UK silicon industry’.125 Technology transfer to the industrial
partners of the defence establishments was effective, but these were predominantly
defence-oriented companies that were content to stick to defence R & D and pro-
curement contracts rather than seeking out opportunities for civil markets.126
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Although potentially dual-use, these technologies were not widely adopted for civil
markets by UK industry for two reasons. First, there was initially little market for III–V
semiconductors outside defence (with obvious exceptions such as civil radar). Second,
even where there was civil potential (for example with LEDs), the UK companies with
close ties to the defence establishments were unwilling or unable to realize this potential.
Initially promoted by some as an alternative, higher-speed, material to enable faster
chip speeds,127 or as a specialist material for military microwave and opto-electronic
applications, gallium arsenide would only later prove commercially successful in uses
such as mobile phones, digital television, remote controls and laser ‘pick-ups’ for CD
and DVD players.
The high levels of defence support for III–V materials did produce some UK civil
success, but many believe that there were missed opportunities for the extension of the
technology to mass-market consumer products. By and large, non-UK companies were
the ones to ‘make millions of dollars out of the chips. And the systems that go in these
things, your telephones and radars. They make millions of dollars out of that. Poor little
Britain doesn’t make any money out of that’.128
Instead, most UK exploitation of III–V technology was restricted to three types of
market. First, UK companies have had notable successes in the supply of production
equipment such as crystal pullers, MOCVD reactors and epitaxial reagents. Second,
not surprisingly given the reason for so much defence R & D funding in the ﬁrst place,
UK ﬁrms supplied customized III–V products for defence procurement. Third, British
industry also found a market for III–V components for use in large civil systems, such as
civil radars or communications systems. For example, GEC’s (formerly Plessey’s)
Caswell centre supplied GaAs components for both military and civil radars. Similarly,
the success (for a while) of semiconductor laser manufacturing at STC at Paignton (later
owned by the Canadian company Northern Telecommunications or Nortel) owed much
to supplying the telecommunications market.
The classic explanation put forward for the failure of UK companies –GEC is the
example most often cited – to develop commercial markets based on technology
stemming from military R & D hinges on their reliance on defence funding, and
preference for the high proﬁt margins of procurement contracts.129 The widely held
view – often mentioned by staff at research establishments such as Malvern – is that UK
companies with their main interests in defence procurement had ‘a big comfort zone
around them’.130
127 In the mid-1980s a strategy document produced by the UK Royal Radar and Signals Establishment
stated, ‘The use of high speed logic for fast computers has until recently been realised exclusively using silicon
integrated circuit technology. However, the improvements of Gallium Arsenide devices has been such that they
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129 See Morris, op. cit. (1), 130.
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According to D.H. Parkinson, a former director-general of research establishments at
the MoD, ‘The only way to get ﬁrms to take action was to initiate a military project – in
general, ﬁrms strongly preferred to deal with research projects initiated by the ministry
through cost-plus contracts.’131 In the electronics area, CVD was a promising source of
funding, but since CVD typically only supported work that was considered of military
importance, and in which the research establishments had some expertise, such an
approach was likely to bias industrial R & D away from avenues that might be more
commercially advantageous. According to many R & D staff within semiconductor
ﬁrms, industry thus became too reliant on CVD funding. Some described the relationship
of industry to CVD as ‘sycophantic’; one R & D manager felt, ‘Too much external
funding weakened their resolve.’132
Thus the overall structure of government support for electronics, dominated as
it was by CVD’s defence interests, provided a setting that did not encourage innovation
in commercial markets. As one account of the UK government’s inﬂuence on British
electronics development puts it, ‘Consistent long-term funding of this nature could well
induce a feeling of complacency in the recipients, who would have little incentive to seek
alternative sources of proﬁt within the commercial ﬁeld.’133
In addition, it has also been claimed that UK electronics companies relied on CVD to
set their research agendas. The failure of UK companies to pursue R & D on integrated
circuits in the 1960s is said to have stemmed from lack of support for this area by CVD.
However, CVD’s limited support for integrated-circuit work was due to the belief that
such an obviously commercially important area could be left to industry to support.134
According to Dickson, there was ‘a vicious circle that reﬂected both the power of CVD’s
inﬂuence and the industry’s over-reliance on CVD support’.135 However, CVD funding
was not primarily concerned with establishing a broad industrial base in electronics, but
rather was focused ‘speciﬁcally at satisfying MOD requirements’: ‘The consequence of
this policy was to strengthen the tendency of indigenous semiconductor manufacturers
to concentrate on producing microelectronic components for “niche” military require-
ments and to weaken their incentive to compete within commercial markets.’136 As a
1989 report by the UK Government’s Advisory Committee on Science and Technology
argued, UK industrial reliance on defence funding in the electronics sector ‘occurred
partly because of a preference to invest in defence rather than civil R &D combined with
the fact that the technologies associated with defence work were unlikely to have much
potential relevance in the civil sector’.137
Although this analysis of complacency due to military support appears plausible, it
does not tell the whole story of what some see as UK commercial underachievement in
III–V semiconductors. It is signiﬁcant that the most successful areas of UK exploitation
131 Quoted in Morris, op. cit. (17), pp. 291–292.
132 Dickson, op. cit. (17), pp. 115 and 118.
133 Morris, op. cit. (17), p. 272.
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135 Dickson, op. cit. (17), p. 118.
136 Morris, op. cit. (17), p. 282.
137 Advisory Council on Science and Technology (ACOST), Defence R & D: A National Resource, 1989.
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of III–V technology involve particular types of market. All these markets have one thing
in common, distinguishing them from consumer product markets, which is that products
are ‘made to order’ rather than ‘made to sell’. Unlike consumer products where buyers
are sought after production, made-to-order goods are only produced once a buyer
has agreed terms. Investment is therefore far less risky because it can be based on,
and costed into, procurement contracts. Indeed, as a former GEC manager, Derek
Jackson, noted of defence procurement, ‘You didn’t have to invest. And you got paid for
development.’138
Herein lies the great challenge to achieving spin-off from defence technology into
mass-market civil products. Whereas defence procurement typically emphasizes high
performance (product innovation), mass-market products must compete on price
and quality and therefore require investment in production technology (process
innovation). However, during the period of most importance for the development of
III–V materials, from the 1960s onwards, UK industrial investment declined relative to
its competitors.139 Since the 1970s, with the main exception of pharmaceutical ﬁrms,
UK industry has had much lower levels of investment in R & D than are found in the
UK’s competitors.140
A ﬁnancial environment which demands short-term returns on investment – as faced
by publicly quoted UK companies – can be very unforgiving on manufacturing industries
which must compete in global markets, in some cases against competitors (notably in
Germany and Japan) able to operate on longer ﬁnancial timescales due to less
dependence on shareholders. Cyril Hilsum, research director at GEC’s Hirst Centre
from 1983 to 1992, described the problem thus:
there is no question that if you had a good idea in GEC and you put it up you have to show a
positive cash ﬂow in three or four years . . .whereas the same question, when it was put to
Siemens, was six or seven years.141
The limited ambition of the UK electronics industry can thus be attributed to the
‘prevailing attitude of “short-termism”, typiﬁed by GEC under the directorship of Lord
Weinstock’.142
This UK situation can be contrasted with Japanese companies that typically operate
within a ﬁnancial structure that enables them to be ‘committed and patient
138 Quoted in Stephen Aris, Arnold Weinstock and the Making of GEC, London: Aurum Press, 1998,
p. 118.
139 See the tables reproduced in David Edgerton, Science, Technology and the British Industrial ‘Decline’
1870–1970, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 62.
140 UK pharmaceutical industry’s investment record can be explained, at least in part, by the government
drug procurement system that in effect guarantees a certain return on investment. For an analysis of the
performance of the British electronics and pharmaceutical industries see G. Owen, ‘National environment and
international competitiveness: a comparison of the British pharmaceutical & electronics industries’, Centre for
Economic Performance, Working Paper No. 561, March 1994.
141 Oral evidence provided by a delegation chaired by Professor Cyril Hilsum to the House of Lords’
Science and Technology Committee, regarding the inquiry into Innovations in Microprocessing (8 May 2002),
available at www.ioppublishing.com/activity/policy/Consultations/Industry_and_Innovation/page_29796.
html.
142 Morris, op. cit. (1), p. 325.
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innovators’.143 Thus, when Dr Akai of Sumitomo was asked whether some of the large
number of Japanese GaAs suppliers would drop out of the market because there was
oversupply, his response exempliﬁed the Japanese approach: ‘They won’t drop out.’144
The strength of patient innovators lies in the ability to continue technology
development and production even though the market may initially be small and
unproﬁtable. For example, the advances in low-dimensional structures that originated
from work in the 1970s only began to produce signiﬁcant commercial reward over a
decade later:
LDS offered exciting new technology but new devices required not only that but
new applications which could beneﬁt from those technologies . . . [N]o one at that
juncture envisaged the massive consumer demand for microwave systems in the guise
of personal telephones which was to engulf us all in the 1990s. The high electron
mobility transistor was ﬁrst demonstrated in 1980 and found a niche as the signal
ampliﬁer at the front end of every satellite TV receiver, a market which has continued
to grow steadily, if not explosively, ever since. (Though, from a chauvinistic British viewpoint,
it was unfortunate, perhaps, that most of the proﬁt went to Fujitsu, rather than to GEC!)145
However, given the ﬁnancial conditions facing publicly listed UK companies –with
shareholders requiring early returns on investment – the choice made by companies such
as GEC to increasingly prioritize defence contracts is not unreasonable.146 Military
procurement was ‘an area where Whitehall’s “cost-plus”method of pricing meant it was
impossible not to make a proﬁt, and where the government would ﬁnance much of the
necessary research’.147 Moreover, during the period in question, defence procurement
was growing more rapidly than overall UK manufacturing, and typically UK suppliers
received preferential treatment in obtaining contracts.148 As management consultants
McKinsey noted in a 1988 report apparently focused on GEC: ‘Increasing concentration
on defence and telecom was, for some companies, a conscious strategy to maintain
relatively high ﬁnancial returns provided by these “protected sectors”’.149
Although the R & D supported by defence funding and the technology produced by
the defence establishments apparently provided companies with technical expertise that
could be used in commercial products, this was far from enough to guarantee
commercial success in competitive world markets. Even if it was possible to predict
that III–V materials would ﬁnd widespread civil applications, the challenge lay more in
predicting the exact timing, and thus, in industry, gauging the correct time to invest. As
one of the key ﬁgures in this history, Cyril Hilsum – a III–V pioneer at Baldock and then
143 Martin Fransman, ‘The Japanese innovation system: how does it work?’, in Mark Dodgson and Roy
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Malvern – put it, ‘It is a story of exploitation, though much of the use came in
unforeseen, and probably unforeseeable, ways.’150
The requirement for short-term returns on investment in the UK means that timing is
critical because entering a market too early without demand can be fatal to long-term
prospects.151 Thus Morris notes that ‘aid from the RRE, along with MOD funding,
helped Plessey become a world leader in gallium arsenide technology during the late
1960s and early 1970s, although the devices produced as a result (gallium arsenide
FETs) were too advanced for the existing market.’152
The period in question, from the 1960s to the 1980s, also marked the rise to
dominance of the Japanese innovation system in many of the product areas with which
UK electronics manufacturers would have had to compete. Attempting to compete – as
another UK company, Courtaulds, discovered with carbon ﬁbre153 –may well have been
expensive and futile. The USA too proved a difﬁcult competitor as Department of
Defense support for gallium arsenide manufacturers through the 1994 Title III
programme fostered US competitiveness, no doubt in part because US defence
procurement also provides a much larger market than was available to UK companies
(which is typically a key explanation given for the dominance that the USA attained in
silicon154). Given the size of the indigenous defence market in the US, it would be
unrealistic to have expected UK ﬁrms to compete on a sustained basis.
The story of gallium arsenide and other III–Vmaterials is thus one of both success and
failure. It can be seen as one of failure to gain the greatest sustained industrial beneﬁts
from commercial spin-off from UK defence R & D on III–V materials. Or, one could see
the commercial success that was achieved as a bonus, resulting from government support
carried out for military purposes. The dominance of defence in the post-war UK
innovation system helped provide a technology base with much spin-off potential, but
ironically it also engendered industrial conditions that may have limited the capacity of
UK industry to make the most of this.
150 Cyril Hilsum, ‘The use and abuse of III–V compounds’, in Advances in Imaging and Electron Physics
(1995) 91, pp. 171–188, 171.
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153 Spinardi, op. cit. (64).
154 See Morris, op. cit. (1).
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